Tensions in Ukraine: Reconstruction Strategies

Shifting Ukrainian Identity and Partition

An increasingly definitive Ukrainian identity has been paramount to this growing nationalism. Russian aggression within the invasion has boosted Ukrainian national identity, though this has increasingly become defined in anti-Russian terms, posing potential challenges to future reconciliation efforts. The ‘Ukrainianess’ carried by the ‘Ukrainian’ delineation, separated from that of a ‘Citizen of Ukraine’, has become increasingly pronounced, taking on a nationalistic meaning fraught with ‘psychological attachment’ and unrelenting loyalty. Conversely, the identity of those in the occupied regions remains divided, both amongst themselves and in the eyes of Ukrainian nationalists. This prior lack of national identity, both amongst Ukrainian people in their movement away from Russia and towards a conception of ‘Ukrainianess’, and amongst populations in the East and the South, unsure of who to align themselves with, has come to shape an increasingly tense relationship between the two camps.

Conclusively, the war has been a major driver in the consolidation of Ukrainian identity, to the benefit of the war effort and Ukrainian resolve, but too for the benefit of far-right nationalist ideologies and to the detriment of social cohesion within the occupied regions and among Russian-speaking individuals within Ukraine. Polling from 2023 showed 84% of Ukrainians had negative feelings about Russians; only 9% targeted their hatred towards Putin and the Russian political system, whereas 35% blamed ‘all Russians’. This indiscriminate animosity towards the Russian population, propagated by the far-right and adopted by a wide cross-section of society in the wake of growing nationalism, will likely pose challenges to post-conflict development and stability. Whilst in 2022 only 2% of the population of Ukraine identified as Russian, and a further 1% identifying as both, this minority will nonetheless be placed in a precarious situation, alongside those individuals from the occupied Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk).

Putin’s alleged willingness to negotiate a ceasefire, alongside his current bid for the establishment of a ‘buffer zone’ in the northeast, comes at the cost of freezing fighting along the existing lines, resulting in a considerable loss of territory for Ukraine. Whilst Kyiv started the war hoping to restore its 1991 borders, this has proved unfruitful over the past two years, and continued efforts will require increased foreign support which European and Transatlantic allies are increasingly unwilling to provide. Still, many rightfully believe that Ukraine’s partition has already occurred. The Russian occupation of regions of Southern and South-Eastern Ukraine, the Donbas, Zaporizhia, Kherson and Crimea, constituting 22% of Ukraine, is considered by some as a de facto partition of Ukraine, shaped by differing allegiances as well as imposed control by Russian forces. Ukrainians in the occupied regions are reportedly made to speak Russian over Ukrainian, with children forced into Russian schooling, being made to sing the Russian national anthem, observe Russian state symbols and learn Kremlin-backed Russian history, all whilst facing the threat of being removed from their parents if the later refuse the novel curriculum. Ukrainians have further been made to give up their passport in favour of a Russian alternative and risk deportation or imprisonment if they refuse to comply. The campaign undertaken by the Russian state in occupied Ukrainian Oblasts has been thorough, often predating the full-scale invasion, and thus has greatly impacted the identity of those in the area.

Civil unrest is likely to remain

Thus many researchers see that a reconquest of these territories, and their impending re-incorporation into Ukrainian society, would lead to increasing instability. Many conscripts from the Donbas region have fought on the Russian front lines since 2014, fighting for their own home territory. This clash of allegiance, be it genuine or enforced by Russian forces, is likely to cause hostility in a post-conflict scenario, where the reincorporation of ‘enemy soldiers’ is likely to face boisterous opposition from Ukrainian citizens. Whilst the true loyalties of those living in occupied territories remain hard to identify given tight media control in those regions, an overwhelming feeling of war fatigue and resentment for Ukrainian forces is reported. A widespread feeling of having been abandoned by the Ukrainian leadership and government remains, and a great desire for the ceasing of conflict regardless of which entity, Ukraine or Russia, controls the territory, has taken over the Donbas. This seeming apathy is resented by the Ukrainian population, especially given the growing levels of nationalism overtaking the Ukrainian political scene. Tensions with the Southern territories, given either de facto or de jure partition, is thus likely to remain.

Even prior to Russia’s 2022 invasion, tensions around the idea of a partitioned Ukraine remained high. Ukraine’s nationalist movements remained great opponents of Zelensky’s early suggestion for ‘special status’ for the Donbas regions; Zelensky’s 2019 proposed referendum in the Donbas regarding its future status was quickly cancelled in the wake of violent nationalist protests in Kyiv. Two years into the conflict, such a compromise is no longer available. And yet, the alternative appears most drastic. The official acceptance of the loss of these territories is perceived as a political death sentence for any Ukrainian president, as nationalist groups in their emboldened state are likely to oppose de jure partition through violent protest. Dissident voices, however, have encouraged desistance from the occupied territories as a necessary price to pay for NATO and EU membership. Acknowledging the possible dangers which may come from efforts towards reintegration, such dissidents pose that ‘nothing good will ever come to Ukraine from Donbas’, an extreme and highly divisive, anti-nationalist stance to take in the current Ukrainian context.

Embracing the ‘bad guy’

Another critical way in which Ukrainian nationalism has manifested in the past two years has been in the rise of armed militias aiding in the Ukrainian efforts against the Russian invasion. Arguably the most infamous of these militias, the Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC) has been at the forefront of such efforts. Consisting of Russian emigrants in Ukraine, the group has seemingly aided Ukrainian efforts, although the latter does not consider the group as aligned with the Armed Forces. Denis Kapustin, commonly referred to as Denis Nikitin or White Rex, the leader of the RVC, remains a key figure in this rising nationalism. Deemed one of the most influential neo-Nazis militants in Europe, Kapustin considers himself a Russian-nationalist above all. His group’s support for Ukraine is solely instrumental, based on their deep hatred of Vladimir Putin, a leader they deem to be ‘not nationalist enough’, and geared towards their many self-admitted political ambitions and agenda of ridding Russia of Putin’s rule. He has been described by Bellingcat as ‘a true self-promoter… primarily interested in his own power, image and standing’, a description which enhances the chance of him posing a threat to Ukrainian stability in the future. 

Ukrainian moderates have made clear how Kapustin acts as a ‘godsend’ to Russian propagandists, given Russia’s ambition to maintain the narrative of ‘de-Nazifying’ Ukraine. Regardless, Ukraine has embraced this ‘bad guy’ as an ally against Putin, choosing to ignore the group and its leader’s problematic past and present far-right and monoethnic views in favour of cooperation and operational support. The RVC stands to benefit most from the invasion as well as from their relationship with Ukraine, in ways which may come to be highly detrimental to a post-conflict scenario. Not only is their political agenda unclear, posing possible threats to future stability in the region, but their growing capacity and appeal pose a major threat to Ukrainian democracy. The RVC has seemingly grown into a sizable force, possessing capable arms, vehicles and established bases, as well as a growing recruitment system spanning into other Eastern European nations as well as Russia itself. Whilst this may not appear an immediate threat, this imminent far-right, neo-Nazi sentiment in Eastern Europe may come to have highly significant consequences in the wake of any given peace scenario.

Chance of impending democratic deterioration

Freedom House has noted the far-right’s negative impact on Ukrainian democracy in the past, highlighting its temporal relevance and growth since the start of the full-scale invasion. Their activities challenge the legitimacy of the state and the Zelensky presidency, and in this pose a physical threat to left-wing, feminist and LGBT+ activists, as well as ethnic and religious minorities. Many of these groups have attempted to gain electoral representation with little success. Yet, Ukrainian authorities have been accused of doing little to control or stop their violent activities across the capital. Far-right groups’ goals of ‘cleansing’ the public space of anyone they find harmful to the nation, or unacceptable to the ongoing conflict, remain starkly anti-democratic. Moreover, beyond the role of the far-right remains the fact that Zelensky, now two years into the conflict and due to face an election in May 2024, which has been duly postponed due to the war effort, is losing public support. Relying on the maintenance of martial law and of his resolve in the face of two years of mixed results, decreasing Western support and an increasingly pessimistic population, Zelensky faces criticism now more than ever from all sides, with his polling figures falling steadily since 2022.

Chance of heightened extremist activity

Such far-right organisations benefited greatly from the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution, riding out the wave of patriotism that it incentivised, as nationalism became increasingly legitimised. Moreover, resulting from the invasion of Crimea and the Donbas, the far right was able to shed the perception that it was merely a fringe ideology held by antisocial individuals in society, shaping instead a new perception of themselves as the only true patriots and defenders of the fatherland. They are increasingly present in the media, utilising social networks to freely disseminate their radical messages and demands, and making use of press attention at their marches and rallies to further spread awareness for their cause, with some even acting as commentators on national television. Finally, as the full-scale invasion has led civilians to embrace being armed, this new comfort may present novel threats to the stability of society in a post-conflict scenario, where right-wing nationalism becomes increasingly acceptable, and tensions run high.

These many critical elements in the Ukrainian context thus pose as eminent threats to stability in the medium-term. As Zelensky’s legitimacy seems to be waning in the face of an ever-large, militarised nationalist right-wing movement, and so as identity-based tensions are sure to erupt in the face of unwelcome changes as the conflict comes to a halt, the internal Ukrainian context appears as complex as its external issues.

Implications for Safe and Comprehensive Post-Conflict Reconstruction

In the face of such growing domestic challenges, a need for comprehensive post-conflict development and reconstruction arises. Many international actors have acknowledged this. The 2024 Ukrainian Recovery Conference recognised the need to look beyond economic growth, noting the human dimension as crucial for the maintenance of a stable operational space. Looking to social recovery and inclusiveness as critical determinants in this, such a comprehensive post-conflict approach must be employed in order to address the possible threats addressed in this article. Cooperation with a wide variety of local actors, primarily veterans, internally displaced peoples, returnees and ethnic/national minorities is paramount in counteracting waves of destabilisation sure to emerge in this period.

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) will play a critical role in this regardless of what peace conclusively looks like. The process by which individuals, in this case from independent militias as well as some armed citizens, lay down their arms and agree to break away from military structures in the wake of peace and transition to living complementary amongst a multinational civilian society, may prove somewhat challenging in this context. The likely continuation of tensions, regardless of potential peace processes, are likely to shape a tense domestic society, which will thus need comprehensive solutions if social harmony and stability are to be achieved. Efforts towards reconstruction are likely to be extensive and prolonged: long-term plans and willing commitment are thus highly necessary if this is to be undertaken successfully in the long term.

The international community’s support for Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction must extend beyond economic and physical reconstruction: it must adopt an inclusive approach, fostering an environment where social cohesion is prioritised. The significant shifts in Ukraine’s social structures and demographics, in the wake of the war, must be addressed, alongside the varying needs of different social groups.